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Abstract—Cryptography has become an essential for 
providing security in embedded system applications. The 
employed cryptographic primitives should provide strong 
protection such that the security of the system is not 
compromised at any point in the lifecycle of a secure 
operation. This particularly includes the secure generation 
and maintenance of cryptographic keys. In general this 
assumption is difficult to accomplish, since there are attacks 
that come under this umbrella ranging from brute force 
attacks on the key to capturing the node to extract the key. 
In this paper we investigate and analyze ICMetrics and its 
counterpart scheme referred to as the scheme for the 
generation of strong high entropy ICMetrics session key 
pairs. ICMetrics is a key technology that computes the secret 
key based on hardware/ software properties of a device, 
thereby providing resilience against node capture attacks, 
while high entropy key pair generation scheme is employed 
to strengthen the generated ICMetrics basis number, so as to 
safeguard the generated strong key pairs from brute force 
and rainbow table attacks. 
Keywords-Brute force attacks, rainbow table attacks, 
ICMetrics, cryptographic key. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In today’s world, all cryptographically secure applications 
require authentication of users/devices for secure 
communication to take place. The notion of proper and 
trustworthy authentication revolves around using 
appropriate keys of sufficient strength for carrying the 
secure operations. This mainly depends on the appropriate 
generation and protection of cryptographic keys, so that 
there is no threat to integrity, confidentiality and 
availability of the cryptosystem. Without appropriate 
generation and handling of keys, keys could be easily 
guessed, modified, or substituted by unauthorized 
personnel who could then intercept sensitive 
communications [10].  
Cryptographic algorithms that are used to provide 
secure communication in embedded system applications 
depend on the use of stored encryption/decryption keys. 
These algorithms have the inherent disadvantage that the 
compromise of an embedded system device, can lead to 
key being revealed to the adversaries [5]. Integrated 
Circuit Metrics or ICMetrics [2-4] is an alternative to 
stored encryption/decryption keys that uses unique 
measurable properties and features of a hardware device 
to generate a value that can serve as a key for 
cryptographic operations for a device. However the 
generated ICMetrics key suffers from weaknesses of low 
entropy and short length making it easy to compromise 
for an attacker. Therefore for the ICMetrics key to be used 
for cryptographic operations, it must be strengthened, 
bringing an increase in entropy and length of key, so that 
it cannot be compromised at any point of a cryptographic 
communication [14]. 
The scheme for the generation of strong ICMetrics 
session key pairs is designed for the purpose of improving 
the entropy and length of the key so that the generated 
ICMetrics key pairs are safe against attacks on 
cryptographic keys. As mentioned above, the core 
challenge with the ICMetrics generated secret key is the 
entropy and length of the generated secret value. The 
ICMetrics key can be safeguarded from different attacks 
on keys by employing schemes to strengthen weak keys, 
by increasing the length and entropy of the key. A scheme 
for the generation of high entropy ICMetrics session key 
pairs is proposed in [11-12] that propose the generation of 
strong ICMetrics key pairs of sufficient length using 
SHA-2 based key derivation function [9], [15]. The 
scheme iterates through multiple rounds of the SHA-2 
based hash function to stretch the secret value to the 
required length, thereby also generating a key with high 
entropy. This increase in length of the ICMetrics key 
safeguards the key from brute force attacks [6]. 
Hashing and key stretching provide a layer of security 
for the key generation however if the hashed key is 
compromised, it is still vulnerable to rainbow table 
attacks. The attacker can easily use previously calculated 
hash and corresponding plaintext to crack the hash. To 
defeat the rainbow table attack on strong ICMetrics 
session key pairs, the proposed scheme further 
incorporates the use of random session ID assigned to 
each participating device that helps defeat the generated 
high entropy ICMetrics keys from rainbow table attacks 
[7]. The session key pairs are temporarily generated for 
every session and remain valid precisely for one 
communication session. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows; in 
section 2 we discuss the attacks inherent to cryptographic 
keys. In particular the brute force and rainbow table attacks 
on ICMetrics keys is discussed in section 3, which is the 
focus of this paper. Section 4 discusses the ICmetrics 
technology and its features. An overview of a strong 
ICMetrics session key pair generation scheme is given in 
Section 5 To fully understand the threat model, section 6 
outlines how ICmetrics will safeguard against node capture 
attacks by taking two different scenarios of possible brute 
force and rainbow table attacks. The final section 
concludes our paper. 
II. ATTACKS ON CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS 
Sensitive embedded system applications require 
appropriate key generation mechanisms to be used for the 
generation of strong cryptographic keys. These strong 
cryptographic keys must possess properties of sufficient 
entropy and length so that they cannot be easily cracked 
by an adversary. Without the appropriate generation and 
handling of cryptographic keys, the integrity, 
confidentiality, and availability of communications can be 
severely affected. The following section explains the 
major threats to the usage of weak keys in security 
applications. 
A. Brute Force Attacks 
Brute force attacks try to discover a valid key by trying 
out different possible key combinations [8]. A successful 
brute force attack allows an attacker to find the 
cryptographic key, thereby breaking into the 
cryptosystem. Brute force attacks can be prevented by 
using strong keys of sufficient length for secure 
cryptographic operations. Strong keys of sufficient length 
hinder the attacker’s ability to launch a brute force attack 
by using a large key space, and making it impossible for 
the attacker to recover the key in a reasonable amount of 
time. 
B. Rainbow Table Attacks
Rainbow table attacks try to break the cryptographic key 
by pre-computing hash values for different key 
combinations [6-7]. These attacks are launched by 
constructing rainbow tables that store a hashed value for 
every word in the key dictionary. A cryptographic key can 
be broken by looking up the hash values and their 
corresponding plaintext key in the rainbow table. 
III. THREAT MODEL 
A brute force attack is a very common methodology 
adopted by adversaries to break cryptosystems with strong 
cryptographic operations but weak keys; whereby instead 
of finding weaknesses in the encryption system, the 
attacker tries to crack the cryptographic key used for 
performing the cryptographic operations. The attacker 
tries each possible key combination to find the correct key 
that has been employed for carrying out the cryptographic 
operations [6]. From an attacker’s perspective, longer 
keys are harder to break compared to shorter keys, since 
the resources required to launch a brute force attack grow 
exponentially with an increase in key size. The notion of a 
successful brute force attack is to find the key that has 
been used to perform ciphering operations, thereby 
deciphering all the encrypted data using the found key to 
recover the plaintext [8]. Figure 1 depicts a scenario 
whereby the attacker’s try to break the key used in 
embedded system devices for secure cryptographic 
operations. 
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Figure 1. Attacks on ICMetrics Keys 
 
Rainbow table attacks pre-compile a series of hashes and 
their corresponding keys for key lookup. Each rainbow 
table entry is started with a randomly selected input and 
its corresponding hash. Rainbow table entries are 
computed by chains of hash functions and reduction 
functions that transform a random input value to its final 
hash value [6]. The purpose of a hash function is to hash a 
plaintext to generate a hash value, while a reduction 
function does the reverse to transform a hashed value to 
its respective plaintext; both of these features enable 
storage of the pre-computed hashed keys in a compact 
manner [18]. However a reduction function is not the 
inverse of a hash function, so computation of a reduction 
function on a hash value generates a completely new 
plaintext value. Rainbow tables store the starting plaintext 
and final hash value after performing multiple iterations 
of hash and reduction functions. Rainbow table attacks are 
more efficient as compared to brute force attacks and are 
therefore able to crack the cryptographic keys quickly. 
Rainbow tables store pre-computed hashes for all possible 
key combinations, so that the key can be efficiently 
cracked by hash and corresponding key lookup. 
IV. ICMETRICS-INTEGRATED CIRCUIT METRICS 
ICmetrics or Integrated Circuit metrics makes use of 
system level characteristics to provide identification to the 
system [3]. It generates keys based on the hardware/ 
software characteristics and specification of the node. 
ICmetrics compute the required metrics on those hardware 
and software characteristics that are difficult for the 
attacker to deduce. These metrics/ features are not static 
but infact vary in a pre-determined fashion. For example, 
the address and value from the data transactions of a 
processor; its program address; and metrics for the 
effectiveness of the program and data caches derived from 
performance counters, etc [4].  
After each key generation stage the produced 
encryption key is temporary and exists only locally, and 
the reproduction of the key once again takes place from 
measurable characteristics of the integrated circuit [2]. 
ICmetrics is not dependent on any particular encryption 
algorithm and there are no secret keys to share between 
the sender and receiver. ICmetrics generates an encryption 
key directly from measurable properties of a given 
hardware device, similar to the way biometrics extracts 
human features to perform an operation. 
Analogous to biometrics, the features extracted from 
integrated circuits might not be stable, in that case the 
feature values may be based on values taken from a 
Gaussian distribution [5]. 
V. STRONG ICMETRICS SESSION KEY PAIR 
GENERATION SCHEME 
The generated ICMetrics key cannot serve as a useful 
key for cryptographic operations in its raw form, since it 
might be too short or have low entropy, thereby making it 
very easy for the attacker to guess and break into the 
system. Therefore in [11-12], we present an approach for 
the generation of strong ICMetrics session key pairs, that 
generates key pairs possessing properties of sufficient key 
entropy and length. The scheme aims to make the weak 
ICMetrics key suitable for use in secure cryptographic 
operations. 
The strong ICMetrics key pair generation scheme, 
generates the session key pairs using the ICMetrics basis 
number fed into SHA-2 based key derivation function that 
generates high entropy public/private key pair of 
sufficient levels of security. The design of the SHA-2 
based key derivation function forming the basis of the 
strong key pair generation scheme rests on the ICMetrics 
secret key and a random session token from the trusted 
authority. The random session tokens for each entity are 
generated by trusted parties corresponding to their 
particular networks. These session tokens are based on 
random ID’s that are assigned by trusted party higher up 
in the hierarchy from the requesting node. The effect of a 
random session token is to create a large set of possible 
keys associated with a particular raw ICMetrics key. The 
iterations of the key derivation function also lead to a 
significant increase in number of rounds performed by the 
attacker to derive the key [17]. The resultant high entropy 
session key pairs generated are valid for a single 
communication session. The session based strong 
ICMetrics public/private key pair generation mechanism 
has the following features that address the keying issues 
in secure embedded system applications: 
1. To safeguard against issues related to key compromise, 
the proposed architecture is based on the use of 
ICMetrics values for key pair generation.  
2. As stated above, each node in the network 
(entity/trusted party) is assigned a random ID that 
remains valid during a communication session and a 
completely new random ID is assigned for subsequent 
communication sessions. The trusted party makes use 
of this random session ID to generate a session token 
that helps safeguard against various sorts of 
cryptanalytic attacks. This random session token also 
serves to identify/ authenticate the participating 
entities. 
3. The high entropy session key pairs are formed by 
combining the ICMetrics generated basis number with 
the session token generated by the Trusted Party. Both 
of these secret values are combined through a SHA-2 
based key derivation function [12]. 
4. The main challenge with the ICMetrics generated basis 
number is the entropy and length of the generated 
secret value. So the scheme generates a high entropy 
key of sufficient length using SHA-2 based key 
derivation function [13] with the session token and 
ICMetrics basis number as input. It further iterates 
through multiple rounds of the SHA-2 based hash 
function to stretch the secret value to the required 
length, thereby also generating a key with high entropy 
that is resistant against brute force and rainbow table 
attacks [18-19]. 
5. Lastly the key pair generation scheme generates a 
public key corresponding to the generated high entropy 
private key by computing the Hermite Normal Form of 
the private key [1]. The Hermite Normal Form is 
particularly suitable for public key generation since its 
unique, non-reversible and doesn’t require any random 
values for operations. 
VI. ATTACK SCENARIOS 
In the following section we use two scenarios to further 
elaborate on the threat model of a brute force and rainbow 
table attacks launched on weak ICMetrics keys and 
further how the scheme for the generation of strong 
ICMetrics session key pairs safeguards from these threats. 
A. Resilience against Brute Force Attacks 
The first major threat to cryptographic keys is the 
possibility of being cracked by brute force attacks. The 
adversary’s goal is to break the cryptographic key using 
software which tries different possible character 
combinations in quick succession, until the correct key is 
found. The brute force algorithm uses a trial and error 
technique, which tries out several key combinations to 
find the key used for cryptographic operations, so that the 
adversary is able to decrypt all information destined to the 
embedded system device. To aid the attacker in the launch 
a brute force attack, the attacker makes use of a high-
performance computer. The attacker machine tries out a 
large number of key combinations at a very fast pace to 
recover the key in a short period of time. The high entropy 
ICMetrics session key pair generation scheme has the 
ability to resist against brute force attacks, since the 
generated strong keys have high entropy and sufficient 
length (256 bits or 512 bits).  
The first strength of the scheme that helps safeguard 
the keys from brute force attacks is the use of random 128 
bits device ID assigned to a participating device for the 
duration of any particular communication session. This 
random value acts as a salt in the SHA-2 based key 
derivation and stretching function employed for the 
generation of high entropy ICMetrics key pairs, as shown 
in figure 2. The generated high entropy ICMetrics keys are 
hash values of either 256 bits or 512 bits in length, and are 
computed by going through multiple iterations of SHA-2 
based key stretching and key derivation function. These 
features of length, entropy and randomness directly 
translate into more time being taken to break the key, and 
making brute force attack impossible to launch. Moreover 
since the computed high entropy ICMetrics key pair only 
lasts for a single communication session, the attacker has 
very little chance of breaking the 256/512 bits high entropy 
keys during that time. Once the session is over, completely 
new high entropy key pairs are computed and used for 
cryptographic operations. So the adversary has to start the 
attack all over again.  
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Figure 2. Threat Model-Brute Force Attack 
B. Resilience against Rainbow Table Attacks 
In the second scenario of cracking an ICmetrics strong 
private key, the attacker tries to launch a rainbow table 
attack on the hashed strong ICmetrics private key. To 
launch a rainbow table attack, the attacker generates a 
large database of all possible key combinations and their 
corresponding calculated hash values to launch a rainbow 
table attack. Depending on the length of the key and the 
employed character set, the attacker pre-computes many 
hash values and then stores the key and corresponding 
calculated hash value in the form of rainbow tables sorted 
by their hash value. If the key employed in the 
cryptosystem is too long or uses a character not part of the 
character set known to the attacker, then the generated 
rainbow tables are completely useless and the key cannot 
be cracked with those generated rainbow tables. To 
successfully launch a rainbow table attack on the hashed 
strong ICMetrics private key, the adversary searches the 
rainbow table for the hashed key and its corresponding 
plaintext key. If the hashed key is found in the rainbow 
table, then the attacker is successful in finding the original 
key; otherwise the attacker is unsucessful since the hashed 
value might not be present in the rainbow table. 
A major problem with unsalted key hashes in the 
possibility of a rainbow table attack being launched, that 
can break the password in an instant, since a hashed key 
always corresponds to a specific original key. The high 
entropy ICMetrics session key pair generation scheme has 
the ability to resist against rainbow table attacks, since the 
scheme employs a random 128 bit device ID for 
computation of strong ICMetrics key pairs, which proves 
to be a very effective method for combating rainbow table 
attacks. The use of a salt value in the strong ICMetrics 
session key pair generation scheme makes pre-computed 
rainbow tables useless, since this means the adversary 
having to compute a separate rainbow table for each 
random 128 bit value, which also requires knowledge of 
the salt value being used during that particular 
communication session. This process of pre-computation 
of rainbow tables for salted hashes is much slower; since 
it first requires the adversary to find salt values specific to 
the communication session, and then further to compute 
the rainbow tables with a 128 bit random value at run 
time.  
 
Table 1. Effect of Random ID on Generated Session Key Pairs 
 
Device ICMetrics Basis 
No. of Device  
Random 
Device ID 
Generated High 
Entropy session 
Private Key 
Generated High 
Entropy Public 
Key Pair 
A 1a29n 2638weh23b 0x4r238n4nfm 0xhrhiwheeru 
B defg8 U4893bb454 0xjerhhewkr9 0xertkherk48 
C q2np6 nkr349061e 0x3nrje83jrk 0x9347yhtg9u 
A 1a29n f893rlm087 0x5h5nrfhrnf 0xhh474urhf5 
A 1a29n 34jghif981 0xjgjfur8er8 0x8rne38793h 
B defg8 rjndfbe83n 0xwrhriuy34y 0x4y4yu4rhri 
 
As example illustrated in table 1, all the devices forming a 
part of the network are assigned a random ID by the 
Trusted Third party that remains valid for the duration of 
the session. A salt value is associated with an ICMetrics 
basis key based on the random ID assigned by the trusted 
third party. Both the ICMetrics basis number and the 
random partial key assigned by the TTP are combined and 
fed to the SHA-2 key derivation function, as shown in 
figure 3. So the randomly generated session ID for every 
device in the network randomizes the partial key for the 
device, thereby generating a completely different 
ICMetrics private key for every session. This also 
safeguards against rainbow table attacks, since for every 
session an ICMetrics basis number for any particular 
device will always correspond to a different hash value as 
shown in table 1. The public key is then computed by 
calculating the Hermite Normal Form of the session 
private key. 
 
Figure 3. High Entropy Key Pair Generation Scheme [10] 
Unless the attacker knows the random ID, he/she cannot 
extract the private key and therefore the pre-computed 
rainbow table turn out to be completely useless. For the 
attacker, trying to break the salted ICMetrics key 
increases the time and complexity thereby making the 
strong ICMetrics session key pairs impractical to break, as 
shown in figure 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Threat Model-Rainbow Table Attack 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
ICMetrics is a key technology that generates the 
cryptographic key for the device based on its hardware 
and software characteristics. However the generated 
ICMetrics key suffers from weaknesses of low entropy 
and insufficient length and is highly susceptible to brute 
force and rainbow table attacks. In this paper we analyze 
the security properties of the scheme for the generation of 
high entropy ICMetrics session key pairs, and further 
elaborate on how it strengthens the ICMetrics keys while 
helping safeguard against brute force and rainbow table 
attacks. The SHA-2 based key stretching and key 
derivation function that is part of the proposed scheme 
helps increase the entropy and length of the ICMetrics 
key, thereby making it safe for use in cryptographic 
applications. This also safeguards the key from brute force 
attack since the attacker is not able to break longer keys in 
sufficient time frame. The random ID assigned to a device 
for every communication session generates a completely 
new hashed key in every session and therefore hinders the 
attacker’s ability to pre-compute rainbow tables. 
Therefore using the scheme for the generation of high 
entropy ICMetrics session key pairs, resilience against 
brute force attacks and rainbow table attacks is 
strengthened and overall survivability of the network is 
also enhanced. 
VIII. FUTURE WORK 
Our future plan is to test our scheme through 
experiments and analysis, thus benchmarking the results 
against existing key generation schemes that provide 
security against brute force and rainbow table attacks. We 
expect that our proposed solution will be an efficient 
solution providing resilience against brute force and 
rainbow table attacks. 
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